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ROBERTA ROMANO*
The papers by Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde (GSW) and by Ed-
wards and von Winterfeldt (EW) provide us with excellent syntheses of
fascinating literatures that are of importance to anyone interested in
human behavior. I learned a great deal from these papers and find my-
self persuaded by GSW's contention that information overload is not a
serious issue for consumer law and by EW's conclusion that cognitive
processes are, in fundamental ways, learned intellectual skills. However,
viewing the most useful role of a commentator to be that of an irritating
troublemaker, my remarks will primarily be directed to what I believe
are the more problematic aspects of their positions.
With this caveat concerning my objective, my comments are organ-
ized along three lines of inquiry. First, I have some questions about spe-
cific arguments or assumptions in the papers. Then, I will raise two
questions of first principle that are suggested, yet not pursued, by GSW,
but that I believe need to be answered to develop an intelligent position
on consumer legislation. EW's characterization of the dynamics of the
attorney-client relationship poses similar issues. Lastly, I offer some
thoughts concerning the irrelevance of information overload and the
learned nature of the cognitive process from the perspective of the deci-
sion problem of consumers of financial assets.
* Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1973, University of Rochester; M.A. 1975, University of
Chicago; J.D. 1980, Yale University. I have benefited from a discussion with the Yale Law School's
Half-Baked Lunch Group.
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I
GSW's discussion of information overload depicts consumers as em-
ploying a "satisficing" strategy: consumers do not choose the best prod-
uct available in the marketplace as they would if they were optimizing
because the costs either of acquiring information or of processing it pre-
vent them from engaging in the optimal search strategy. While GSW
appear to consider this characterization of the consumer choice problem
as essential to their thesis, I question the analytical advantage of the
satisficing terminology. Their definition of satisficing, "do[ing] as well as
one can, given the circumstances,"' is a cogent statement of a con-
strained optimization problem and is identical to the definition of con-
sumer behavior, or the axiom of rationality, given in a standard
microeconomics course. As I interpret their description of the problem
of product diversity in which information acquisition costs are high, the
consumer is maximizing product choice subject to constraints-the costs
of search-that draw in the opportunity set. The notion of satisficing
adds little to that discussion. Thus, I am skeptical that much is gained
by affixing the satisficing label to the purposive activity the authors are
describing, and the authors themselves seem to acknowledge this at one
point.2
Satisficing more properly refers to the second problem that GSW
discuss, namely, the possibility of suboptimal consumer choice because of
information processing problems. The limits of cognitive capacity, and
not information acquisition costs, were the key for the organization theo-
rists who formulated the concept of satisficing. Herbert Simon, for ex-
ample, viewed the mind as a scarce resource,3 so that the critical problem
concerned the allocation of information assimilation and usage. More-
over, in this context of information processing costs, specification as a
constrained optimization problem is more difficult because of the amor-
phous nature of the relevant constraints, including the limits of human
cognition in solving complex choice tasks. GSW, however, carefully de-
tail the experimental and other evidence that consumers generally make
the correct-their best--choices in these situations, where we might
otherwise expect to see signs of information overload. Hence, in addition
to GSW's conclusion that information overload is not a severe problem,
it is unlikely, if we accept their analysis of the data, that the use of a
1. Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 279 (1986).
2. Id. at 287 n.18.
3. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 9 (1978).
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satisficing heuristic results in suboptimal product choices, in comparison
to the choices of a maximizing strategy.4
As I do not have expertise in experimental design, I am hesitant in
advancing the second set of questions that I had after reading the GSW
paper. For it is quite often of little help, if not a positive hindrance, when
a novice makes suggestions to experts toiling in the field. These ques-
tions concern the format of the Grether and Wilde (GW) experiments:
whether the experiments could be adapted to mitigate some features that
I thought were artificial, and to what extent such changes would affect
their findings.
To generate product attribute levels, GW drew a numbered bal
from a bingo cage. It seems to me that the mix of real product attributes
would not be random, as in the experiment. Just as a compensatory
choice rule involves consumers trading-off product attributes, we might
imagine that producers engage in a similar calculation in selecting their
product's attributes, hoping to match consumer preferences. Such a pro-
cess is missing in the bingo ball formulation. I wonder if a nonrandom
combination of attribute levels would alter search strategies and, in par-
ticular, the relation between search strategies and costs that GSW find,
such as the lack of cross-attribute effects from a reduction in one attri-
bute's search costs.
More precisely, I question the experimental format's assumption of
independence across attributes which excludes the possibility of prefer-
ence correlations between attributes. Though I tend to think that the
finding of irrelevancy of an overload problem will be robust, I wonder
how, if at all, the use of correlated attributes would affect the experi-
ments' results. I imagine that this concern might be eliminated if con-
sumers bundled attributes that are highly correlated and treated them as
one generic or composite attribute; the consistent finding of researchers
that consumers evaluate products according to a small number of salient
attributes may be such a conceptualization of the choice process. Could
this interpretation provide a basis for the independence assumption, in
addition to experimental tractability? In a world with no information
4. GSW might insist that they chose a model of satisficing because in the Grether and Wilde
experiments, which predicted a different relation between order of search or cutoff levels and search
costs for the two strategies, subjects appeared to follow the satisficing approach. But this may not
affect attribute choices: if ideal and actual choices differed, the difference would have been more
pronounced in the experiments than in the process outlined in the GSW paper because the experi-
ments used a pure conjunctive choice method, in which the consumer chose the first product to meet
the cutoff levels, rather than the two stage process outlined in the paper, in which the consumer
screens products in order to choose a preferred one from among a final set.
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problems, of course, if attributes are perfectly positively correlated, then
the product with the highest quality or quantity per attribute would be
the only product to survive in the market. But it may be equally plausi-
ble to assume, even apart from information problems, that attributes are
negatively correlated, as consumers engage in trade-offs in the compensa-
tory choice process. And if, as seems likely, attributes are negatively and
positively correlated, then the offsetting tendencies may make it appear,
incorrectly, that the product's attributes are independent.
It would be helpful to know which of these scenarios best captures
the relation among attributes in order to better assess the significance of
the findings of experiments that treat attributes as independent. For in-
stance, the first order conditions GW derive for an optimizing strategy
that contrast with the simplified nonoptimizing strategy followed by the
experimental subjects are counterintuitive. Although, as EW note, intui-
tion can be faulty, I would not have expected to find cross-attribute ef-
fects as the search costs of one attribute decrease when the attributes are
independent. For although GSW predict an unambiguous change in
screening behavior-in the choice of attribute cutoff level and attribute
search ordering-when search costs change, the change as a function of
cost might decrease, increase, or not change at all, depending upon how
important the attribute is to the consumer. That is if, as GW assume,
consumers are not engaged in a compensatory choice process, then a lexi-
cographic noncompensatory strategy is imaginable.' I assume that such
a choice strategy could be directly tested in GW's experiments by appro-
priately varying the dollar values of the attributes. It would be interest-
ing to know whether such an explanation would change the experiment's
results on the relation between costs and cutoff levels or search orderings.
Of course, what we would ideally like to know is the choice process
outside the laboratory.
A further permutation on the search strategy modeled in GW's ex-
periments would be to incorporate learning: it may be that consumers'
perceptions of the relevant attributes change, and in particular, the set of
attributes may expand or contract in the course of searching. It is con-
ceivable that a consumer learns about the relevant attributes of some
items only after search has been initiated. Moreover, a dynamic learning
process would limit the usefulness of relying on most of the marketing
5. In some experiments, however, only a few subjects used a lexicographic choice rule. See
Lussier & Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMiR
RESEARCH 154, 160-62 (1979). It is also possible that in these circumstances consumers do not
reallocate costs among attributes but simply engage in less search.
[Vol. 59:313
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experiments, which measure the consistency between the subjects' ideal
choice indicated before the experiment and their actual choice made in
the course of the experiment. It would be interesting to know whether
learning increases the "correctness" of consumer choices, especially as
the decision becomes more complex. EW's findings suggest that it
would.
While on the subject of GW's experiments, I also have a gripe con-
cerning their use by GSW: I found little to support GSW's conclusion
that GW's experiments imply that consumers make correct choices when
confronted with increasing task complexity. In a more complex experi-
ment subjects chose from among compound lotteries. The number of
compound lotteries represented the number of products, and binary lot-
teries within a single compound lottery represented product attributes.
Once out of the simple lottery setting, the subjects' choices followed es-
sentially a random strategy. GSW maintain, however, that real consum-
ers do better than GW's subjects because of the consumers' familiarity
with the objects of choice.
GSW's optimistic conclusion concerning consumer choice under in-
creased task complexity is in the spirit of one of EW's criticisms of the
negative inferences often drawn from cognitive illusion experiments in-
volving probability assessments: namely, that the experiments focus on
skills irrelevant to real-world decisions.' Still, the fact that GW's sub-
jects could not fall back on a familiar heuristic or algorithm to solve the
compound lottery choice problem seems to me to point to a problem in
experimental design and not to demonstrate that consumers solve com-
plex tasks correctly. I take this idea also to be central to EW's position
stressing the need to be careful in generalizing from experiments that do
not accurately capture actual decision problems. Indeed, EW's analysis
concerning the learned nature of cognition suggests that the most appro-
priate policy implication to draw from GW's experiments is that we
should provide consumers training in how to compute the appropriate
choice algorithm.
In this regard, it would be of interest to study how choices would
vary if the subjects had to make the lottery decision jointly. This would
test the effect of organization on decisionmaking. For instance, we could
see whether subjects would specialize and develop expertise. My criti-
cism of the gap between GW's experiment and GSW's conclusion does
not mean that I am not sympathetic to the contention that people, in
6. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S.
CAL. L. REv. 225, 246 (1986).
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general, solve complex decision problems correctly. I am. But I do not
think that GW's experiments on their own lend strong support to such a
conclusion. It is the cumulation of the research from the marketing ex-
periments, as well as everyday experiences in making consumption deci-
sions, that, I believe, support GSW's thesis of the irrelevance of
information overload.
Reflecting on which factors are crucial to GSW's thesis further leads
me to note the problematic aspect of their policy position on the merits of
disclosure and the benefits of reducing search costs. The position, in
large part, depends upon the authors' prior work modeling the search
process and, in particular, when the efforts of searchers produce efficient
pricing and/or product terms.7 If preferences differ substantially be-
tween searchers and nonsearchers, however, then the market may not be
efficient, and while GSW's proposed policies may alter the mix of search-
ers and nonsearchers, they may also only reduce the costs of those al-
ready engaging in search. This is fundamentally a messy empirical issue.
But even if preferences are heterogeneous, that does not imply that a
regulator would be better able than firms to discern what nonsearchers
desire.
Lastly, I want to question briefly a suggestion of GSW that I found
troubling. At the end of their discussion of the benefits of disclosure for
ameliorating the information acquisition problem, GSW state that deci-
sionmakers (state regulators) can use the conjunctive nature of the search
process to influence consumer choice by the selection of the product at-
tribute to be disclosed.8 If this were the case, it would severely restrict
GSW's modeling efforts, for its logical extension leads into the hornet's
nest of endogenous preferences. For, the statement implies more than a
recognition that purchasing incentives can be altered by changing
prices-that reducing the search cost of a given attribute for which the
consumer has a pre-existing preference allows the consumer to raise his
or her cutoff level. It suggests that if the government mandates the dis-
closure of a specific attribute, a consumer will come to believe that the
attribute is desirable or important. Without even reaching the ethical
issues implicated by attempts to manipulate preferences in general,
whether consumers are satisficing or maximizing, their preferences must
7. In this regard, the authors might have explored an analogous solution to the overload
problem, in which some proportion of consumers has superior information processing capacities.
For an analysis of the situation where the processing capabilities of consumers differ, see Hal-
tiwanger & Waldman, Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heteroge.
neity, 75 AM. EcoN. RE. 326 (1985).
8. Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 1, at 294.
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be fixed for economic modeling to be tractable. Moreover, the claim is
really little better than wishful thinking: marketing experts frequently
stress that firms cannot create consumer demand by advertising.9 There
is no compelling reason to believe that the state would be any more suc-
cessful than the private sector with regard to such preference-shaping
techniques.
Before turning to air some issues not explored by GSW that I be-
lieve are important for developing informed policy positions on consumer
law, I have two brief comments concerning EW's paper. First, while I
find their effort to cheer us up over the depressing experimental evidence
concerning the imperfections in human decisionmaking processes a
healthy antidote to the dreary nihilism of much of present-day legal
scholarship, I believe the policy implication of their paper would be a full
employment act for decision analysts. But apart from this not entirely
fair objection that the recommendation is self-promoting, the more seri-
ous issues are whether everything of importance for decisionmaking can
be learned, and how costly it is to hire the necessary experts. Second, I
disagree with their assertion that no participant in the legal process is
assigned the function of making a right decision.10 This assertion has too
narrow a view of the participants in a legal dispute. The designated deci-
sionmaker, who is an active participant in the fact-finding process, be it
judge, jury, or administrator, is supposed to make a correct decision. In
addition, the requirement of written opinions, stating reasons for a deci-
sion, provides a record for evaluating whether a case has been rightly
decided.
II
The findings of the empirical literature which GSW have summa-
rized are necessary but not sufficient for formulating a coherent policy
concerning consumer legislation. Even if we accept GSW's assessment of
the significance of the information overload literature, a complete theory
must address two important issues: the dynamics of the political pro-
cess-under what conditions will the laws GSW deem optimal be en-
acted-and the incentives that firms face-what institutional features
prevent the voluntary disclosure of desired product attributes? The sec-
ond issue, relating to the adaptiveness of the domain of private ordering,
also implicates some of the conclusions EW draw for the legal system
from the cognitive illusion experiments.
9. T. ROBERTSON, J. ZIELINSKI & S. WARD, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 31, 271 (1984).
10. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 6, at 269.
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A positive theory of the political process is essential because it en-
ables us to predict what legislation is likely to be enacted, a factor that
could influence our judgment concerning whether a market defect is
worth the legislated cure, or whether the cure is being offered because a
defect exists or for some other reason. For example, one theory of the
political process, the cartelization or rent-seeking approach, views poli-
tics as a negative sum game.11 In this view, legislation is the product of
interest groups engaging in legal plunder, securing monopoly rents or
transferring resources or wealth to their members from other groups in
the society. The capture theory of regulation contains a parallel perspec-
tive on the administrative state. That theory contends that the regula-
tory process is often captured by the regulated, to the detriment of the
citizenry, whose interest agencies are ostensibly established to protect.12
This explanation challenges the economic rationale for regulation, that
the state provides a means to alleviate market failures which occur in the
context of public goods, externalities, and transaction costs.
To restate the problem, any recommendation to design legislation or
administrative rules to alleviate information acquisition difficulties leads
to a further question: Will consumers benefit from the end product of
the legislative or rulemaking process? If the rent-seeking hypothesis is
correct the prediction would be quite pessimistic. For even if the goal of
some proponents of disclosure regulation is to aid consumers by reducing
search costs, that objective would be distorted by, if not lost in, the polit-
ical process.
In general, apart from the costs-a qualification that seems to me to
be far more important than GSW acknowledge-I find it hard to devise a
plausible scenario in which consumers would be disadvantaged 3 by dis-
closure requirements; the potential for rent-seeking seems far greater in a
regime of product regulation that restricts output than in one of attribute
disclosure. In particular, it is also difficult to envision the existence of
transaction-specific assets in the context of consumer products and the
11. E.g., J. BUCHANAN, R. TOLLISON & G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY (1980). For an early statement of the concept of legal plunder, see E. BASTIAT,
THE LAW 21 (D. Russell trans. 1950) (1st ed. 1853) ("The present-day delusion is an attempt to
enrich everyone at the expense of everyone else; to make plunder universal under the pretense of
organizing it.").
12. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971).
13. Consumers are disadvantaged whenever producers can extract monopoly profits.
[Vol. 59:313
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overload debate that would suggest consumers benefit from product reg-
ulation as a governance structure that efficiently resolves bilateral ex-
change problems. 14 However, there is still some use in speculating about
the producers' interests at stake in the implementation of the disclosure
policy GSW advocate as the appropriate response to overload issues.
GW's experimental work suggests, in fact, that some producers may ben-
efit from mandated disclosure. They state that for a firm with a compar-
ative advantage in producing a specific product attribute, the successful
marketing strategy is to lower the costs of observing that attribute with
respect to all brands in the product's class, and not simply with respect
to the firm's own brand. 5 Since obtaining the pertinent data concerning
rival products to enable consumers to make attribute comparisons would
be quite costly for the individual firm, the firm with the comparative ad-
vantage gains, vis-A-vis its competitors, from government mandated dis-
closure. But if consumers desire the attribute, then they benefit from the
disclosure as well. If there is a wealth transfer in this context, it is an
intra-industry transfer from one set of firms to another.
We also know that problems faced by one firm in an industry can
create negative externalities for all firms. For instance, announcements
of product recalls in the drug and automotive industries result in stock
price losses for all firms in the industry, and not just for the firm that is
the subject of the recall. 6 With an experience good, whose attribute
levels are not observable prior to purchase and use, a firm could attempt
to profit from low-quality production, and its buyers (and others to
whom they convey their experience) might be reluctant to purchase the
product (at a high-quality price) from any manufacturer in the future. In
such a scenario, firms that produce at the minimally acceptable high-
quality level would back disclosure regulation that would knock out or at
least identify the low-quality competition. Again, while this story ex-
plains why firms might support disclosure laws, it is not inconsistent with
benefits to consumers, assuming the attributes in question are those con-
sumers demand. Indeed, the high-quality attribute firms might well
favor a system of mandatory attribute quality levels rather than disclo-
sure, for such a regulatory scheme would more directly eliminate low-
14. But see Goldberg, The Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect Information, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 683 (1974) (minimum standards may reduce transaction costs of search). For
this to be so, all consumers would have to want the minimum amount of information. See generally
0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
15. Grether & Wilde, An Analysis of Conjunctive Choice: Theory and Experiments, 10 J. CON-
SUMER RESEARCH 373, 383 (1984).
16. Jarrell & Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 512 (1985).
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cost competitors, while consumers, who want to trade-off quality and
price, would prefer disclosure.7
These theoretical possibilities can lead to the formulation of further
empirical research projects that would help policy analysis in the con-
sumer law field. It would be interesting to know which firms support
what types of disclosure rules. For example, do firms with comparative
advantages at producing large (small) amounts of desirable (undesirable)
attributes push for their disclosure; under what circumstances, if at all,
do we see minimum cutoff, rather than disclosure, legislation; what hap-
pens to firms' stock prices when disclosure (or cutoff) rules are adopted;
and does the degree of competition in a product market change after the
implementation of such rules?
Of course, attribute disclosure requirements may increase product
prices, an outcome GSW dismiss as insignificant. If data is not readily
available to the firm, it must be produced, and it must also be communi-
cated to consumers. These costs are independent from any cartelization
effect. The appropriate question is, therefore, whether the price increase
is offset by the benefits of improvements in consumer decisionmaking.
While consumers may not overdose on information, they may not want
to foot the bill for it either. In any event, estimates of disclosure costs
would be helpful for making more informed policy recommendations.
The reference to costs and benefits leads me to another unmentioned
issue in the GSW paper: if consumers desire information concerning cer-
tain attributes, why don't firms voluntarily provide that information?
GSW appear to contend that the disclosure problem arises from too few
consumers searching for the desired attribute, so that firms do not receive
the demand signal. But we do know that many firms invest substantial
sums to learn what consumers want-marketing research is a thriving
commercial (and educational) sector. In the absence of either extremely
high disclosure costs, idiosyncratic consumer tastes or barriers to entry
in a particular product market, it is difficult to imagine that demand for
the observation of a particular attribute would go unsatisfied. To put it
another way, if the benefits of disclosure outweighed the costs, I suspect
that the attributes would be disclosed by producers without the necessity
of prodding by the state. There is some support for this conclusion: in
the securities law context, most of the information whose disclosure was
mandated by federal law was voluntarily provided to investors prior to
17. Cf. Maloney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.
LAW & ECON. 99 (1982) (environmental quality regulation reduced output and restricted entry
benefiting certain producers and not consumers).
HeinOnline -- 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 322 1985-1986
COMMENT" COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS
the passage of the legislation. 18
One might contend that voluntary disclosure is not feasible because
consumers would be unable to verify a firm's claims without government
certification and, consequently, would not pay a price sufficiently high to
cover the cost of disclosure. But this is not a convincing argument as a
state agency is not the only mechanism for warranting the accuracy of a
firm's disclosures. Third party institutions often test or guarantee attri-
bute levels; familiar examples are Consumer Reports and, for financial
assets, public accounting firms.
Inadequate voluntary disclosure might be more likely in the case of
undesirable attributes, such as a product's carcinogenic content. An-
other empirical project would be to see if most disclosure requirements
consist of such matters. Yet even for negative product attributes, one
could hypothesize the existence of private incentives for releasing the in-
formation. First, one constraint on nondisclosure is the fear of subse-
quent lawsuits, particularly if punitive damages are awarded.19 Second,
especially in today's world of health and safety conscious consumers,
nondisclosure could backfire: consumers may interpret no news as bad
news. Such a perception could force firms to disclose even undesirable
attributes to allay the development of unduly negative views of their
product's attributes. But this argument may be more convincing with
respect to financial assets. The inference from no good news about a
firm's prospects may more certainly be bad news in that context because
the number of relevant product attributes for corporate securities is far
less than that for most consumer products. Nondisclosure in that case
may, therefore, be more highly correlated with the existence of negative
information.
Questions concerning the adequacy of private incentives are also rel-
evant for evaluating EW's speculations on the existence of cognitive
problems in attorney-client relations. EW suggest that lawyers may fall
into a variety of cognitive illusion traps in tending to their clients' affairs,
such as misleading themselves about a client's problems or goals by rely-
ing too heavily on the client's narrative.20 I think the appropriate way to
examine this thesis is to ask: What are the incentives for attorneys who
handle numerous cases during their lifetimes? Are they more like
18. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market. An Evaluation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 63 Am. ECON. REv. 132 (1973).
19. Cf. Haddock & Spiegel, Punitive Sanctions, or Property Rules and Liability Rules: One
View of the Edgeworth Box (1985) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file with the Southern Califor-
nia Law Review).
20. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 6, at 271-72.
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weather forecasters, whom EW describe as successful prognosticators, or
like the experiment subjects who commit systematic decisional errors?
Once phrased, the question answers itself: lawyers are repeat players in
the legal system who feel a financial pinch if they badly misjudge a cli-
ent's case. Unlike the subjects in the experiments, and like the forecast-
ers who are linked to their Brier scores, attorneys' livelihoods are on the
line if they repeatedly misperceive the cases before them.
There are obvious incentives for a lawyer to probe the client's story.
If the lawyer does not, the opposing attorney surely will. In addition,
because many lawyers specialize and handle a number of similar cases,
they develop a good working knowledge of the client goals and problems
that can arise in most legal situations, even if a particular client is not
articulate. Fee structures also help: whereas contingent fees provide a
lawyer with an incentive, among others, to investigate the client's claims,
fixed hourly rates provide a client with the impetus to state precisely his
or her objectives and describe the complaint. Furthermore, lawyers can
be held liable for malpractice, although the issues EW discuss are un-
likely to create such a cause of action for a client. While these factors
certainly do not resolve end-period problems or analogous situations,
such as the drafting or planning of a transaction in which errors would
not become apparent until years later, other mechanisms do mitigate the
problem, such as large law firms, which, surviving the lifetimes of indi-
vidual members, develop valuable reputations.21 In sum, notwithstand-
ing the legal profession's efforts at cartelization by regulating advertising
and entry, the practice of law is highly competitive, and, accordingly, the
occurrence of the difficulties EW hypothesize in the attorney-client rela-
tion seems, to me, largely illusionary.
III
Reading the GSW paper as someone whose work is primarily in
corporate law, I found the policies advanced in the consumer law field
more foreign than I had expected. For although mandated disclosure to
protect investors is a long-standing, albeit widely debated, policy of cor-
porate law, the perils of information overload are virtually unnoticed in
the field.22 If overload concerns enter the corporate law discourse, they
21. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists An Economic Inquiry into
the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985).
22. One of the few examples in corporate law of an information overload argument, although it
was not used to advocate increased regulation, is a decision striking down a state anti-takeover law
which required more extensive disclosure than the federal legislation on the ground, among others,
[Vol. 59:313
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take the form of prescribing what firms can disclose, and not what they
can sell. A suggestion to restrict the number of stocks available in the
marketplace because investors will be confused by having too many se-
curities from which to choose would, I think I can safely say, universally
be thought to be ludicrous. But why, then, are suggestions to limit the
number of products available on supermarket shelves, as opposed to the
New York Stock Exchange, considered any less absurd?
The first contrast between financial assets and consumer products
that comes to mind concerns product attributes. Although the number
of securities (brands, if you will) is extremely large, the number of choice
attributes is quite small. In modem portfolio theory, the investor's
choice depends on two parameters, risk and return, under relatively rea-
sonable assumptions concerning the distribution of financial asset rates of
return and investors' attitudes towards risk. Further, these two factors
are linearly related, and hence the most popular valuation model, the
capital asset pricing model, collapses the investment choice into one at-
tribute-the security's sensitivity to changes in the expected rate of re-
turn on the market portfolio (the stock beta). Thus, the number of
attributes that consumers of financial assets need to consider is smaller
than the number of attributes of the products of concern to GSW. Ac-
cordingly, consumers of financial assets presumably eliminate the initial
noncompensatory choice stage of decisionmaking that GSW detail. Still,
the use of salient attributes makes consumer product choices approxi-
mate the limited number of relevant characteristics of securities.
A further possible distinguishing factor may be the degree of homo-
geneity in investor preferences. We need not engage in much guesswork
regarding consumer preferences in corporate law. A very reasonable as-
sumption is that investors want to make as much money as they can on
their investment, although their degree of tolerance for risk or their tax
situation will vary. One of the elegant theorems of finance is the Fisher
Separation Theorem, which states that in perfect capital markets the con-
sumption and investment decisions may be separated and hence, manag-
ers need not inquire into shareholders' preferences in order to operate the
firm. By contrast, in the consumer area, consumption preferences are the
crux of production decisions, and these preferences vary considerably
among individuals. Firms, or more properly their investment bankers,
may therefore have a better grasp of the demand curve they face in the
capital market than in their product markets. Thus, they may know with
that more information is not necessarily better. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687
F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1982).
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greater confidence the essential attributes that need to be disclosed. This
would support a view that voluntary disclosure could work well, or at
least better, in the financial asset context, than in the consumer product
context.23 It also suggests that an overload phenomenon is not likely
with respect to financial assets.
Furthermore, the risk to a consumer of a financial asset is limited to
the loss of the investment, whereas the damage from a hazardous prod-
uct may well exceed its cost. This difference in exposure may require
that more information be disclosed for consumer products, to identify
the potential dangers and to allow the consumer to undertake difficult
subjective damage assessments. As a result, an overload phenomenon
may, again, more plausibly be thought to arise in the consumer product
market.
More important, many investors in financial assets rely on the ad-
vice of experts for their decisions. A critic might contend that this sim-
ply leads to the infinite regress that investment advisors, rather than
investor-consumers, will experience the inevitable overload. But EW's
findings show that expertise minimizes cognitive errors and thereby stem
the brunt of such an objection. I am tempted to assert, from the exist-
ence of such institutions in the financial asset market, that if expertise
were necessary to avoid difficulties for consumers making product
purchase decisions, some analogous services would emerge for those
products. Several examples of the use of experts for consumer goods
come to mind, such as hiring interior decorators and, more generally,
reading Consumer Reports.24
Finally, GSW argue that standardized disclosure may reduce search
costs and consequently lead to optimal decisionmaking. The SEC's ad-
ministration of the securities laws roughly standardizes the presentation
of the information it requires firms to provide, although whether that
information is either helpful to investors or worth its cost is a matter of
considerable controversy. In addition, private organizations impose uni-
formity on firms, such as through the accounting profession's promulga-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles. The standardized
23. For a recent survey of the justifications for mandated disclosure in securities law, see Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
24. Of course, the use of experts does depend on their cost in relation to expected benefits.
Thus, even if expert advice would improve ordinary consumption decisions by the same degree of
magnitude as it aids in portfolio selection, we might only see its use in the financial asset context
because investment decisions involve a greater absolute amount of a person's wealth. This explana-
tion is analogous to GSW's discussion of the different and more extensive search strategies that
consumers adopt for big ticket items.
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format of financial information may curb the potential for what GSW
perceive to be bona fide overload concerns. Standardization may thus
signal that the optimal amount of consumer search takes place in the
capital market.2 5 The market efficiency theory of finance further implies
that the information problems contributing to the overload idea that
GSW describe for consumer product markets will not occur in the capi-
tal market: in an efficient market, there is not much information for indi-
vidual investors to process independently since the stock price fully
reflects all publicly available information concerning firm value.
I have tried to suggest, by the exercise in contrasting financial assets
and consumer goods, how information overload concerns could go un-
mentioned in one field while receiving attention in another. I remain
unconvinced as to the need for a policy restricting consumer choice and I
am willing to accept GSW's position on disclosure, assuming that the
costs are trivial. Yet perhaps the most valuable aspect of both papers is
not their message for specific policies, but rather their program for re-
search. GSW's and EW's work highlights the crucial importance of the
modeling and testing of theories for policy analysis and, further, the as
yet untapped potential of experiments as an excellent avenue for re-
search. The promise of the experimental literature is immense, for it of-
fers alternative ways to begin to test and refine behavioral theories that
are critical for rendering informed decisions on legal issues. And that is
the closing compliment that I have to extend to the authors of these two
interesting papers: they are the harbingers of an exciting time for inter-
disciplinary research.
25. In fact, some are of the view that there is too much search. See Hirshleifer, The Private
and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561
(1971).
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